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2 Ce coeur obsédant, qui ne correspond 
Pas avec mon langage et mes costumes, 
Et sur lequel mordent, comme un crampon, 
Des sentiments d'emprunt et des coutumes 
D'Europe, sentez-vous cette souffrance 
Et ce désespoir, à nul autre égal 
D'apprivoiser, avec des mots de France, 
Ce coeur qui m'est venu du Sénégal? 
[This haunted heart that doesn't fit / My language or the clothes I wear / Chafes 
within the grip of / Borrowed feelings, European ways. / Do you feel mv pain, / 
This anguish like none other / From taming with the words of France / This 
heart that came to me from Senegal?] 
Naomi Garrett. Renaissance of Haitian Poetry, 142. Translation bv Ellen Conroy 
Kennedy, The Négritude Poets. New York: Viking, 1975, 15. 
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Wai Chee Dimock, by way of interdisciplinary intervention, contests 
the sovereignty of "commensurability," not only as a philosophical 
concept, but also as a highly durable and even efficacious "cultural 
disposition" in the post-Reformation world. Commensurability, she 
reminds us, is a "style of rationality" which strives for perfectjustice. At 
the same time, this striving for "the just measure of things" — for what 
is fit, equal, and proportionate — has proven so efficacious that it is 
seen, conversely, as constitutive of rationality per se. what is true of jus-
tice is true of all thinking, all universalizing. In practical deliberation, 
commensurability promises the resolution of all conflicts because all 
competing interests and values can be measured and scaled according 
to the standard of a single agreed-upon end (happiness, pleasure, util-
ity, civic duty). To Dimock, this style of rationality is as questionable as 
it is attractive. Her complaint is that "a language whose charge it is . . . 
to resolve its conflicts into a commensurate order is a language that 
abstracts as much as it translates and omits as much as it abstracts." 
Her concern, then, is to rescue "the stubborn densities of human 
experience unsubsumed and unresolved by any order of the commen-
surate" (5). 
As many readers will recognize, this ethical concern for the "resi-
dues of justice" does not originate with Dimock, and she carefully ac-
knowledges her debt to a multipartisan tradition extending from 
Aristotle to the Frankfurt School, communitarianism, and feminism. 
Her claim to originality lies in the method by which she sets out to 
"unsettle" the notion of commensurability. Dimock calls for "a critical 
practice responsive to . . . the cognitive residues of a text" (141). Re-
sisting a poststructuralist temptation, she does not dispense with jus-
tice perse, but calls for a "non-integral" and "less exhaustive" version of 
it (5). Thus, in the same spirit, one can do justice to this very ambi-
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tioiis book without the blunt instrument of commensurability, but not 
to Dimock's advantage, inasmuch as her book's flaws are roughly pro-
portionate to her ambitions. 
Dimock's critical practice is a version of the interdisciplinary 
perspectivism associated with cultural studies. Unsettling justice re-
quires unsettling the foundations of those disciplines which give com-
mensurability cultural expression and authority. Accordingly, she 
isolates "three languages of justice" — literature, law, and philosophy, 
all discrete "styles of reasoning" or "cognitive domains" (9). She then 
sets them against each other to expose their unique but limited com-
petencies and to show how each acts as an epistemologica! supple-
ment and corrective for the other. We soon see that the relationship 
between law and philosophy is far less interesting to Dimock than is 
the dichotomy that emerges between both of these disciplines and 
literature. Indeed, law and philosophy together are equally commit-
ted to total justice. This alliance encompasses Luther, Hobbes, Locke, 
Kant, Bentham, Marx, Chomsky, John Rawls and Richard Posner; it 
cuts across the fields of jurisprudence, tort and criminal law, moral 
and political philosophy, cognitive linguistics, philanthropy, and the-
ology. In contrast, literature, by which she means primarily the novel, 
"is the most eloquent dissent from that canon of rational adequation 
so blandly maintained in the abstractions of law and philosophy." 
Thanks to the "messiness of representation," "the problem of justice is 
given a face and a voice . . . that plays havoc with any uniform scale of 
measurement and brings to every act of social weighing the shadow of 
an unweighable residue." So enabled, literature is an indispensable 
corrective. Because "it denies us the promise extended by law and phi-
losophy both. . . . it is a testing ground no jurist or philosopher can 
afford to ignore" ( 10). 
However, in defending literature, Dimock oddly diminishes it. If 
literature honors the residues of justice, it is not in conceptual com-
mand of them, even though literature, like philosophy or law, seeks to 
affirm a commensurate order. What decisively distinguishes litera-
ture, and most especially the novel, is that, as a matter of form, it must 
fail to affirm that order. A literary work is only a "sedimentation" of 
residues, that is, of its constitutive "illogic." Indeed, to argue that lit-
erature does "cultural work" is to align it falsely with "instrumental 
reason" ( 169). Works, accordingly, can only dramatize blind collisions 
between contradictory commitments. These assumptions lead to idio-
syncratic readings of Dimock's proof texts, an oddly arbitrary gather-
ing of nineteenth-century American novels and short fiction by 
Cooper, Melville, Rebecca Harding Davis, William Dean Howells, and 
Kate Chopin, among others. Emblematic of her practice is her analy-
sis of Howell's The Rise of Silas iMpham. She argues that the novel "tries 
to imagine a morality commensurate with economic reason" (175) 
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but, generically faithful to the incommensurabilities of experience, 
offers itself as "a failure in the economics of justice" (181). Ultimately 
then, if literature, law and philosophy are blind to their own disabili-
ties, we must turn to the cultural critic, who aligns abstraction and 
residue using the "more supple vocabulary" of a critical discourse that 
is neither literature, nor law, nor philosophy (91 ). 
But in the end, we don't need Dimock's methodological imposi-
tions to mediate between the disciplines. Neither philosophy nor 
law nor literature is as internally pure or self-enclosed as her 
metadisciplinary radicalism requires them to be. Disciplines have a 
functional integrity even as their boundaries prove highly permeable. 
Indeed, Dimock's critique of commensurability is haunted by the fact 
that it is derived from within philosophy itself, from a philosophical 
counter-tradition not merely supplemented by literature but engaged 
in a mutually enrichening dialogue with it. Alasdair Maclntyre and 
Seyla Benhabib, for example, find a middle way between abstraction 
and residue by reintegrating the unencumbered, hypergeneralized 
self of the Kantian tradition into the complex web of narratives that 
constitute a human life. Aligning abstraction with residue is also 
within the competence of the legal profession inasmuch as legal eq-
uity is a judicial practice which seeks to correctively adjust the rigor-
ous precision of unfeeling justice with actual, recalcitrant human 
circumstances. Literature, says Dimock, gives "the problem of justice a 
face and a voice" (29), but, as Kathy Eden has argued, equity is a pro-
cess which confronts legal principle with faces and voices, and thus is 
fundamentally a judicious exercise of the literary imagination. In the 
same spirit, Martha Nussbaum has argued that narrative fiction, be-
cause it privileges contextual complexity, is a rich form of philosophi-
cal inquiry, which is to say that it thematizes human problems instead 
of helplessly dramatizing its own generic deficiencies. 
Thus, in seeking a "more supple vocabulary" of alignment, we 
would do better to read the fictions of literary artists rather than the 
critical fictions of Dimock, who is not the first critic to see herself as 
their rival. That is, we should look instead to, say, Antigone to see how 
the problem of justice is given a face and a voice as Sophocles explores 
the intellectual and emotional consequences of Creon's tragic desire 
to make civic virtue the measure of all action; or to The Brothers 
Karamazov as it tries to work its way past Ivan Karamozov's tragic inabil-
ity to square Christian forgiveness with cruelty to children, or happi-
ness with freedom. True, these are debatable claims about how 
literature works, but they survive as the cognitive residue of a critical 
tradition uneffaced by Dimock's own empirical simplifications. 
WILLIAM BARTLEY 
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The scope of this book is enormously impressive: centred on the 
French Caribbean, it also considers the English- and Spanish-speaking 
Caribbean, pre- and post-revolutionary France, Faulkner and Keri 
Ilulme, while ranging from the famous (Goethe, Conrad) to the ob-
scure (Bissette, Maynard). The main axis is a juxtaposition of the be-
ginning of modern colonialism in the late-eighteenth century with 
decolonization in the mid-twentieth century, to illustrate Bongie's 
concept of the "post/colonial": decolonization is not a clean break 
with the past, and Bongie inserts the slash mark into "postcolonial" to 
indicate an ambiguous separation/complicity of the chronologically 
postcolonial with the colonial period. But the book covers far more 
ground than this, partly because Bongie is unashamedly eclectic and 
digressive. It is, therefore, hard work to read (and the digressions oc-
casionally lead to slippage in the argument). Its "central theoretical 
point of reference" is Edouard Glissants concept of creolization: the 
basis for a postmodern theorization of identity as mixed, fluid, "cha-
otic," non-originary and relational. This creolized identity forms one 
pole of a "creole continuum," whose opposite pole is the essentialist 
conception of identity that Bongie associates with modernism, par-
ticularly with primitivism, racism and belief in a revolutionary future. 
He argues that neither pole can be fully attained, and analyses texts to 
show how they are inevitably drawn back, from one end or the other, 
into the "creole" middle ground; naive essentialism is no longer pos-
sible, but nor is a whole-heartedly postmodern ditching of essentialist 
identitarian discourse. 
This is not to say that both poles have equal status. Bongie's posi-
tion is unambiguously post-modernist and, for all he recognizes the 
necessity of the modernist pole, he is rather patronizing in regard to 
its proponents. And, since postmodernism is positive and modernism 
is negative, the reasons why neither is a tenable stable position are 
very different. Given the centrality of the concept of the continuum, 
an explicit discussion of these differences would have been useful. 
Thus, it appears that what destabilizes the modernist, essentialist pole 
